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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
CRIMINAL LA--VERDICTS-INTEGRATION OF FINDING OF GUILT
AND RECOMMENDATION OF CLEMENCY.-Defendant was indicted for
murder in the first degree. The trial judge charged the jury that
"the unanimous agreement of the jury is necessary to a verdict,"
and later in an attempt to clarify the law respecting jury
clemency in first degree murder cases, allowable under 29 STAT. 487
(1897) as amended 35 STAT. 1152 1909), 18 U. S. C. § 567 (1940),
the trial judge stated: ". . . before you may return a qualified verdict
... your decision to do so must like your regular verdict be unani-
mous." (Emphasis added). The verdict returned was "guilty of
reurder in the first degree", and, as made mandatory by REV. STAT. §
5339 (1875) as amended 35 STAT. 1143 (1909), 18 U. S. C. § 454
(1940), the death penalty was imposed. On appeal the judgment was
affirmed. Andres v. United States, 163 1. 2d 468 (C. C. A. 9th
1947). Certiorari was granted by the United States Supreme
Court. Held, that unanimity on both guilt and punishment is
necessary before any verdict can be returned, and reversal required
in that the trial court's charge could reasonably have led the jury
to believe that it might make two separate decisions, and should
there be disagreement as to the qualifying sentence, then an un-
qualified verdict be leturned. Andres v. United States, 68 Sup.
Ct. 880 (1948).
Section 567 of 18 U. S. C. reads: ".. . .where the accused is
found guilty of murder in the first degee... the jury may qualify
their verdict by adding thereto 'without capital punishment'; and
whenever the jury shall return a verdict qualified as aforesaid, the
person convicted shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life." A
mere reading of this provision would seem to support the conten-
tion of the government in the principal case that the initial deter-
mination for the jury is as to the guilt of the accused, and that upon
a finding of guilt the jury should lay that matter aside and decide
as to the qualification.
Unanimity in finding a verdict is essential in federal jury
cases. American Publishing Co. v. Fisher, 166 U. S. 464 (1897).
Logically, then, under the government's contention in the Andres
case, if unanimity as to qualification cannot be achieved, then the
unanimous decision as to guilt must be returned without qualifica-
tion. The Court, in rejecting the construction urged by the gov-
ernment, looked to "considerations not derived from a mere reading
of the text" and construed the provision in a manner "more con-
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sonant with the general humanitarian purpose of the statute." The
interpretation of the act as made by the circuit court and the Su-
preme Court in the Andres case is supported by one other federal
decision, Smith v. United States, 47 F. 2d 518 (C. C. A. 9th 1931).
W. VA. REv. CODE (Michie, 1943) c. 62, art. 3 § 15 provides that it
the jury find one indicted for murder guilty of murder of the first
degree "they may, in their discretion, further find that he be
punished by confinement in the penitentiary. If such further find-
ing be not added to their verdict, the accused shall be punished with
death. . ." (Italics added). It is apparent that this provision
is susceptible to the same argument advanced by the government
in the Andres case. As in federal jury cases, West Virginia requires
unanimity of the jurors for the return of a verdict. Emory v.
Monongahela West Penn Service Co., 110 W. Va. 699, 708, 163
S. E. 620 (1938). And, the accused in a criminal case is entitled
to an instruction as to unanimity if it is not couched in language
which would invite the jury to disagree. State v. Sibert, 113 W. Va.
717, 169 S. E. 412 (1933). But, the precise issue presented in the
Andres case with respect to § 567 of IS U. S. C. has not been before
the West Virginia court as regards § 15, art. 3 of c. 62. It would
seem not to be an unwarranted presumption to say that should the
issue be squarely presented, the United States Supreme Court's
construction of a federal act substantially like the West Virginia
statute would be accorded weight in construing the state act..
Assuming that a construction of the West Virginia statute
should be made in accordance with the Andres case, it is submitted
that the following instruction, approved in State v. Hatfield, 48
IV. Va. 561, 573, 37 S. E. 626 (1900), and in State v. Staley, 45 W. Va.
792, 797, 32 S. E. 198 (1899), is improper: "The court... instructs
the jury that, if they find the prisoner guilty as charged in the
indictment, they shall further find whether he is guiilty of murder
in the first degree or second degree. If they find him guilty of
murder in the first degree, they may, in their discretion, further
find that he (the prisoner) be punished by confinement in the
penitentiary; and, if such further finding be not added to such
verdict, the judgment thereupon rendered by the court will be
that the prisoner be punished with death." It is true, as stated
in the Staley case (at p. 798), "The court only propounded the
law laid down in the statute." But, if the finding as to both guilt
and punishment is single and indivisible, it is not because of the
statutory expression but in spite of it. To instruct the jury that
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they might "further find'' presupposes that they have already
found, and it is not unreasonable to say that the jury thereby
could be misled into returning an unqualified verdict, though all
twelve had not agreed to do so.
T. E. M.
FEDERAL COURTS - VENUE - "RESIDENCE" OF DEFENDANT IN
FEDERAL RESERVATION GROUNDED ON STATE LAWS CONCERNING AD-
MISSION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS. - Plaintiff, a Massachusetts
citizen, sued defendant Delaware corporation in the Federal Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Virginia to recover for in-
juries received from a fire in defendant's hotel on the Fort Monroe
Military Reservation located in that part of Virginia included in
the eastern district. Service was pursuant to a Virginia statute,
VA. CODE (Supp. 1946) § 3846a, providing that foreign corpora-
tions doing business in Virginia should be deemed to have ap-
pointed the Secretary of the Commonwealth as agent to receive
service of process. The act of cession of the reservation from Vir-
ginia to the United States reserved the right of the state officers
to serve process therein. Defendant, who did no business in Vir-
ginia except that on the reservation, made timely objection to the
venue. After judgment for plaintiff, defendant appealed on the
ground of want of personal jurisdiction. Held, that under state
statutes requiring consent by foreign corporations to constructive
service as a condition of entering to do business within the state,
a foreign corporation doing its only business in that state on a
federal reservation is suable in the locally appropriate federal
court on causes of action arising from the business done provided
the act of cession from the state to the federal government reserves
the right of state officers to serve process in the reservation. Af-
firmed. Knott Corp. v. Furman, 16.1 F. 2d 199 (C. C. A. 4th 1947).
The federal venue statute indicates the district of residence of
either plaintiff or defendant as the only proper venue when fed-
eral jurisdiction is based exclusively on diversity of citizenship.
49 STAT. 1213 (1936), 28 U. S. C. A. § 112 (Supp. 1947). However,
in Neirbo v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 308 U. S. 165 (1939), designa-
tion of an agent to receive service of process in conformity with a
valid state statute as a condition of doing business within the state
was held an effective consent to be sued in the federal courts as
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